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How Do Broad Non-Disclosure
Agreements Afect Labor Markets?
Jason Sockin, Aaron Sojourner, and Evan Starr
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Non-disclosure and nondisparagement agreements (NDAs)
cover more than half of U.S. workers.
n Firms use broad NDAs to prevent
workers from speaking out about the
harms they experience at work.
n Silencing workers with negative
information to share makes it harder
for better employers to stand out,
and harder for workers to avoid bad
employers.
n State laws that narrow NDAs
mitigate these negative spillovers and
help improve the flow of information
about employers.

A
s anybody who has ever changed employers knows, taking a new job is risky. Even
aside from career concerns, there is a chance you may face an unpleasant working

environment or even toxic behavior, such as sexual harassment, discrimination, or wage
thef. Employers can exacerbate the uncertainty job seekers face by using broad nondisclosure and non-disparagement agreements (NDAs) to prohibit current and former
employees from speaking about their negative experiences at work. Tese policies can keep
job seekers in the dark about important aspects of working at a potential new employer.
Te #MeToo movement put a spotlight on how common it is for frms to use broad
NDAs to silence workers, helping perpetuate misconduct at work. Indeed, management
increasingly requires workers to sign broad NDAs as a condition of employment, with
the express goal of limiting employees from sharing negative information about the
employer, even on supposedly anonymous websites like Glassdoor. Over half of U.S.
workers are now bound by NDAs (Balasubramanian, Starr, and Yamaguchi 2022).
Despite this recent attention, the subsequent debates about whether frms should
be allowed to silence workers with NDAs, and recent legislation passed by Congress to
prohibit frms from using broad NDAs to conceal sexual harassment, little if any research
has examined how broad NDAs infuence labor markets. Our new study helps fll this gap.
Core to our study is the passage of laws in California, Illinois, and New Jersey, in
the wake of the #MeToo movement in the late 2010s, that prohibited frms from using
NDAs to conceal unlawful conduct at work. Using the passage of these laws as a natural
experiment, alongside variation across industries where NDA use is low versus high—
where the “bite” of the laws is greater—we ask how broad NDAs afect four outcomes:
1)
2)
3)
4)

For additional details, see the full paper at
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900285.

the fow and value of information workers share about their employers
public measures of frms’ reputation
the ability of competing employers to diferentiate themselves within the market
labor market sorting of workers across frms

Using data drawn from worker reviews of employers on Glassdoor, we fnd that laws
narrowing NDAs increase the amount of negative information workers share by 4.5
percent but have little efect on the amount of positive information shared. We similarly
fnd a rise in sexual harassment complaints made to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, by both men and women. Additionally, these laws reduce the average frm’s
rating by about 5 percent, driven by an increase in low-star reviews. But these average
ratings declines mask variation across employers, with some bearing large hits to ratings
while others changed little, thus increasing the degree of diferentiation across frms.
Finally, we also fnd that narrowing NDAs led to declines in worker turnover as workers
made more informed decisions of where to work.
Taken together, our results suggest that broad NDAs prevent workers from sharing
their bad—but not their good—experiences at work. Tis bolsters the reputation of lowroad employers relative to high-road employers, making it more difcult for workers to
distinguish between them. Te silence induced by NDAs therefore creates costs borne
by high-road frms that are unable to diferentiate themselves, and by workers who are
unaware of the negative aspects of working at low-road employers.
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Indeed, management
increasingly requires
workers to sign broad
NDAs as a condition of
employment, with the
express goal of limiting
employees from sharing
negative information
about the employer,
even on supposedly
anonymous websites like
Glassdoor.

NDAs and #MeToo
NDAs are one in a suite of employment restrictions that frms can use to limit
what workers can do or share during and afer their employment. Other restrictions
include, for example, agreements not to compete and agreements not to solicit clients
or coworkers. Te canonical view of NDAs is that they are used primarily to protect
company secrets. With just a few tweaks, however, they can be written to cover all sorts
of information. For example, the non-disclosure agreement for the Weinstein Company
covered “non-public” information “concerning the personal, social, or business activities”
of everybody who worked for or with the company. Non-disparagement agreements,
which are sometimes written within or alongside non-disclosure agreements (and
which we include within our defnition of broad NDAs), state directly that the worker is
prohibited from disparaging the frm, ofen in perpetuity and in any way.
Legal scholars have long been concerned about the efects of these “hush contracts”
on labor markets, and some suggest that broad NDAs should be unenforceable on public
policy grounds (Hofman and Lampmann 2019). However, until recently no state had
changed their enforcement policy regarding NDAs, and data on NDA use was scarce. Te
uproar about NDAs following the #MeToo movement, however, spurred several states
to reconsider their stance on NDAs. Some states took a narrow approach, focusing only
on training regimens in response to the sexual harassment issue, while the three states
we focus on prohibited frms from using NDAs signed as a condition of employment (as
opposed to a severance or settlement) to conceal all unlawful conduct. We refer to these
laws as “narrowing NDAs.”

How Narrowing NDAs Afects What Information Workers Share
As stated above, we fnd that restricting NDAs increased the amount of negative
information workers share on Glassdoor. Specifcally, we document that the length of the
“Cons” section of workers’ reviews of their employers rose by 4.5 percent in states that
narrowed the scope of NDAs relative to states that did not. Tis can be seen in Panel A
of Figure 1, where the estimates cluster around 0 before the policy change—indicating
little diference between the states that would change their NDA laws and those that
would not—followed by a consistently elevated impact following the change. Although
Figure 1 Negative Information Flows and Job-Title Concealment
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NOTE: The dependent variable in Panel A is the log length of the “cons” section of the employer review. The
dependent variable in Panel B is the likelihood that the individual conceals their job title, conditional on the
review having more negative than positive content. The sample period is 2015–2021, and point estimates are
relative to the calendar half-year before the legislation goes into efect. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
industry and state. Red vertical bars indicate 95% confdence intervals around each point estimate.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Te silence induced by
NDAs therefore creates
costs borne by high-road
frms that are unable to
diferentiate themselves,
and by workers who are
unaware of the negative
aspects of working at lowroad employers.
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it’s not shown, we fnd no efect of the policy change on the length of positive information
shared.
We also fnd that workers who lef negative reviews were approximately 18 percent
less likely to hide their job title, presumably due to less concern about retaliation risk. Job
seekers fnd information coming from less-anonymous sources more valuable, perhaps
because such information is more credible and easier to evaluate for relevance (Sockin
and Sojourner 2022), so we view this as a positive development. Consistent with relieving
the worker of legal risk from sharing negative information on Glassdoor, we fnd that this
efect is driven by relatively negative reviews (Panel B of Figure 1), with no statistically
signifcant efect on job-title concealment among relatively positive reviews.
Additionally, we further estimate that narrowing NDAs led mentions of harassment
and illegal conduct to rise by 22 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Collectively,
these results imply that narrower scope for NDAs gives workers additional freedom to
speak out about their negative experiences at work. Indeed, we bolster this analysis by
confrming that claims of sexual harassment to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission rose for both men and women afer NDAs were narrowed.

How Restricting NDAs Afects Firm Reputation
Next, we ask whether these increased negative information fows lead to changes in
the overall rating of the frm—a public measure of the frm’s reputation. Tis question is
important because if it’s difcult for job seekers to fnd new negative information, and if
this information doesn’t show up in prominent measures of frm reputation, then laws
that narrow NDAs may not have much punch for workers. It’s also not immediately
obvious that a frm’s overall rating would be afected. Afer all, if somebody has a bad
experience at work, they can always give their employer a one-star review, leave no
identifying information, and likely face low legal risks. However, if workers begin to learn
about wrongdoing in their workplace—of which they were previously unaware—then
they may change both the information they share on Glassdoor and their overall rating.
Alternatively, broad NDAs may discourage workers from sharing altogether, such that
narrowing NDAs could also increase the number and composition of reviews.
We fnd that narrowing NDAs reduces the average frm rating by approximately
5 percent (Figure 2). Tese decreases are driven by more one-, two-, and three-star
Figure 2 Overall Star Rating
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NOTE: The dependent variable in each regression is employee overall star rating. The sample period is 2015–
2021, and point estimates are relative to the calendar half-year before the legislation goes into efect. Standard
errors are two-way clustered by industry and state. Red vertical bars indicate 95% confdence intervals around
each point estimate.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Allowing employers to
use NDAs to prevent
workers from speaking
honestly about their work
experiences makes the job
market more inefcient
by restricting the fow of
information about job
quality and concealing
bad behavior.

reviews. We fnd some evidence that the composition of reviewers did change—for
example, women are more likely to post a review afer NDAs are narrowed—but these
compositional changes are not responsible for the overall reputation efect.

The Good, The Bad, and the Sorted
Perhaps more importantly, not all frms were hit with an increase in bad ratings afer
NDAs were narrowed. Instead, while some frms experienced negative reputation shocks,
others did not; consequently, the dispersion in ratings between frms within the same
labor market increased, whether measured by the standard deviation (Panel A of Figure
3) or the interquartile range (Panel B). High-road employers thus became better able to
distinguish themselves from those with low-road practices.
Figure 3 Dispersion in Ratings across Firms within a Market
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NOTE: The dependent variable in each regression is the standard deviation (Panel A) or interquartile range
of frms’ average ratings (Panel B) within each industry-state-half-year. The sample period is 2015–2021, and
point estimates are relative to the calendar half-year before the legislation goes into efect. Standard errors are
clustered by industry cross state in Panel A due to convergence issues, and two-way clustered by industry and
state in Panel B. Red vertical bars indicate 95% confdence intervals around each point estimate.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Finally, using data on hiring and separations from the Census Bureau’s Quarterly
Workforce Indicators, we examine how the policy change in NDAs afected how workers
match with employers. We fnd that afer NDAs were narrowed, industrywide turnover
rates fell (Figure 4), implying greater attachment of workers to employers. We expect that
two mechanisms drive this pattern. First, given that narrowing NDAs increases the fow
of negative but not positive information, job seekers may now turn down jobs that they
would have otherwise accepted because they are more fully aware of negative aspects of
the prospective job. Second, because workers are better informed, when workers do agree
to a new job it is likely a better ft, leading to more stable matches.

Conclusion
While narrow NDAs have legitimate purposes like protecting trade secrets, our results
suggest that allowing employers to use NDAs to prevent workers from speaking honestly
about their work experiences ofers little to no economic beneft to society. Indeed, it
makes the job market more inefcient by restricting the fow of information about job
quality and concealing bad behavior.
Some argue that broad NDAs are justifed because workers receive compensation for
signing them. In some high-stakes settlement or severance arrangements (again, not the
4
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Figure 4 Industrywide Turnover

Our results suggest
that broad NDAs prevent
workers from sharing
their bad—but not their
good—experiences
at work.
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NOTE: The dependent variable is the rate at which stable jobs begin and end by industry-state-half-year from
the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. The sample period is 2015–2021 and point estimates are relative to the
calendar half-year before the legislation goes into efect. Standard errors are two-way clustered by industry and
state. Industry-state-half years are weighted by average employment. Red vertical bars indicate 95% confdence
intervals around each point estimate.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

focus of the laws we study), this may be true—though many later regret giving up their
voice. But when required to sign an NDA as a condition of hire, workers receive little, if
any, compensation—at least in the form of higher salaries (Balasubramanian, Starr, and
Yamaguchi 2022).
Some may also be concerned that these laws give workers an opportunity to make up
harmful untruths about a company. Tis is unlikely to be the case. We already have laws
related to defamation (e.g., libel, slander), which are unchanged over this time period.
Moreover, the laws themselves explicitly or implicitly refer to “truthful statements or
disclosures.”
For too long, harm has thrived in the silence from overly broad NDAs. California,
New Jersey, and Illinois have led the way in changing that situation. Building on this
moment, Congress has recently passed the Speak Out Act, which prohibits frms from
using broad NDAs signed as a condition of employment to conceal claims of sexual
harassment. Our study suggests this is an important step toward improving labor
markets. However, sexual harassment is just one form of unlawful conduct; our study
suggests there is value in enabling workers to speak out about all sorts of misconduct in
the workplace, which benefts both job seekers and employers with better employment
practices.
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